A Game-Theoretic Model of Plagiarism

Gary Hoover

Atlantic Economic Journal, 2006, vol. 34, issue 4, 449-454

Abstract: The damage to a reputation has long been viewed as the main and most effective deterrent against plagiarism among professional economists. We show that it is rational for individuals in the economics profession who want to plagiarize to engage in this activity given current incentives. Recent research concerning plagiarism in the economics profession has highlighted the frequency that instances of plagiarism have occurred. Our paper shows how it is possible given current incentives in the profession for these instances to go unreported therefore removing the threat of damage to a plagiarist’s reputation. We also discuss the harm that such actions cause to the original author and to the profession as a whole. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2006

Keywords: K30); ethics; copyright infringement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:34:y:2006:i:4:p:449-454

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DOI: 10.1007/s11293-006-9029-7

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