The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment
Richard Zeckhauser (),
John Swanson and
Experimental Economics, 2006, vol. 9, issue 2, pages 79-101
We conducted the first randomized controlled field experiment of an Internet reputation mechanism. A high-reputation, established eBay dealer sold matched pairs of lots—batches of vintage postcards—under his regular identity and under new seller identities (also operated by him). As predicted, the established identity fared better. The difference in buyers’ willingness-to-pay was 8.1% of the selling price. A subsidiary experiment followed the same format, but compared sales by relatively new sellers with and without negative feedback. Surprisingly, one or two negative feedbacks for our new sellers did not affect buyers’ willingness-to-pay. Copyright Economic Science Association 2006
Keywords: Field experiment; eBay; Reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (116) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Working Paper: The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:9:y:2006:i:2:p:79-101
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10683/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Experimental Economics is currently edited by David J. Cooper, Lata Gangadharan and Charles N. Noussair
More articles in Experimental Economics from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Sonal Shukla ().