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Public Choice
1978 - 2013
Edited by WIlliam F. Shughart
from Springer
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Volume 155, issue 1 , 2013
Tax earmarking, party politics and gubernatorial veto: theory and evidence from US states pp. 1-18 Jeremy J. Jackson The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization” pp. 19-41 William Pyle and Laura Solanko Inequality in developing economies: the role of institutional development pp. 43-60 Adalgiso Amendola , Joshy Easaw and Antonio Savoia Power indices in large voting bodies pp. 61-79 Dennis Leech Independent central banks, regime type, and fiscal performance: the case of post-communist countries pp. 81-107 Cristina Bodea Satisfaction with democracy and collective action problems: the case of the environment pp. 109-137 Martin Halla , Friedrich Georg Schneider and Alexander Wagner Policy-seeking candidates who value the valence attributes of the winner pp. 139-161 James Adams and Samuel Merrill Do pro-market economic reforms drive human rights violations? An empirical assessment, 1981–2006 pp. 163-187 Indra Soysa and Krishna Vadlammanati Volume 154, issue 3 , 2013
Remembering Vincent Ostrom: unhorsing a dominant paradigm pp. 163-171 David Lowery Trade openness and public expenditure. The Spanish case, 1960–2000 pp. 173-195 Estela Sáenz , Marcela Sabate and M. Gadea The timing of elections in federations: a disciplining device against soft budget constraints? pp. 197-215 Karolina Kaiser and Emmanuelle Taugourdeau Bicameral bargaining and federation formation pp. 217-241 Ross D. Hickey Procyclical government spending: a public choice analysis pp. 243-258 Andrew Abbott and Philip Jones Is there an incumbency advantage or cost of ruling in proportional election systems? pp. 259-284 Che-Yuan Liang The illusory leader: natural resources, taxation and accountability pp. 285-313 Eoin F. McGuirk Islam and democracy: a response pp. 315-321 Marek Hanusch Democracy and countries with Muslim majorities: a reply and update pp. 323-332 Niklas Potrafke Robert B. Ekelund Jr., Robert D. Tollison: Economic origins of Roman Christianity pp. 333-335 Charles North Dennis M.P. McCarthy: An economic history of organized crime: a national and transnational approach pp. 337-340 Nicholas Snow Timur Kuran: The long divergence: how Islamic law held back the Middle East pp. 341-343 Mark Koyama Volume 154, issue 1 , 2013
The resource curse revisited: governance and natural resources pp. 1-20 Matthias Busse and Steffen Gröning Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system pp. 21-37 Adam Martin and Diana Thomas Charitable giving in the German welfare state: fiscal incentives and crowding out pp. 39-58 Timm Bönke , Nima Massarrat-Mashhadi and Christian Sielaff The politics of digits: evidence of odd taxation pp. 59-73 Asmus Olsen Minimizing the threat of a positive majority deficit in two-tier voting systems with equipopulous units pp. 75-94 Claus Beisbart and Luc Bovens Modeling local growth control decisions in a multi-city case: Do spatial interactions and lobbying efforts matter? pp. 95-117 Katharina Schone , Wilfried Koch and Catherine Baumont Committee jurisdiction, congressional behavior and policy outcomes pp. 119-137 John de Figueiredo District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: a comment and reinterpretation pp. 139-148 John Carey and Simon Hix District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences—a reply and new perspectives pp. 149-151 Marco Portmann , David Stadelmann and Reiner Eichenberger Kevin A. Clarke, David M. Primo: A model discipline: political science and the logic of representations pp. 153-156 Paul Dragos Aligica Jason Brennan: The ethics of voting pp. 157-159 Art Carden Volume 153, issue 3 , 2012
Elinor Ostrom (1933–2012) pp. 263-268 Roberta Herzberg and Barbara Allen On choosing the alternative with the best median evaluation pp. 269-277 Jean-François Laslier Nine points of the law: evidentiary rules and the costs of litigation pp. 279-285 Karl Wärneryd The institutional dimension of election design pp. 287-293 Paul Edelman Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures pp. 295-327 Georgios Efthyvoulou Voting and economic factors in French elections for the European Parliament pp. 329-340 Antoine Auberger Contests—a comparison of timing and information structures pp. 341-355 Sandra Ludwig Why suicide-terrorists get educated, and what to do about it pp. 357-373 Jean-Paul Azam Federal legislative activism in Australia: a new approach to testing Wagner’s law pp. 375-392 Stephen Kirchner Is German domestic social policy politically controversial? pp. 393-418 Niklas Potrafke On the optimal number of representatives pp. 419-445 Emmanuelle Auriol and Robert Gary-Bobo Coalition formation on major policy dimensions: The Council of the European Union 1998 to 2004 pp. 447-467 Peter Roozendaal , Madeleine Hosli and Caspar Heetman Adam Smith or Machiavelli? Political incentives for contracting out local public services pp. 469-485 Anders Sundell and Victor Lapuente Tolerance and economic growth revisited: a note pp. 487-494 Eduard Bomhoff and Grace Lee Tolerance and growth: modeling the empirical relationship pp. 495-502 Niclas Berggren and Mikael Elinder Robert I. Rotberg: Transformative political leadership: making a difference in the developing world pp. 503-505 Michael McBride Adrian Vermeule: The system of the constitution pp. 507-509 Jeremy Horpedahl Mark Pennington: Robust political economy: classical liberalism and the future of public policy pp. 511-513 Peter Boettke Andrei Shleifer: The failure of judges and the rise of regulators pp. 515-517 Paul Mahoney Erratum to: Andrei Shleifer: The failure of judges and the rise of regulators pp. 519-519 Paul Mahoney Volume 153, issue 1 , 2012
Remembering Bill Niskanen: pursuing economics as a public science in the service of liberty pp. 1-7 Richard E. Wagner Choosing for others: A neglected element in the theory of collective action pp. 9-16 James M. Buchanan and Y. Yoon Travel visas pp. 17-36 Robert Lawson and Jayme Lemke Why fight secession? Evidence of economic motivations from the American Civil War pp. 37-54 Zachary Liscow Revealing information in electoral competition pp. 55-68 Mike Felgenhauer The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests pp. 69-82 Paul Schweinzer and Ella Segev Costs of taxation and the size of government pp. 83-115 Jørgen Juel Andersen Violence, bribery, and fraud: the political economy of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa pp. 117-147 Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vicente The evolution of sharing rules in rent seeking contests: Incentives crowd out cooperation pp. 149-161 Heinrich W. Ursprung Estimation of party positions: A comment on Schofield and Zakharov (2010) pp. 163-169 Monika Irena Köppl-Turyna Seniority and anti-competitive restrictions on the legislative common pool: tenure’s impact on the overall production of legislation and the concentration of political benefits pp. 171-190 Russell S. Sobel and Matt Ryan Regulators and Redskins pp. 191-204 Bentley Coffey , Patrick A. McLaughlin and Robert D. Tollison Persistent rent extraction pp. 205-213 Leif Helland and Rune Sørensen Determinants of the assignment of EU funds to Portuguese municipalities pp. 215-233 Linda Gonçalves Veiga Correcting mistakes: cognitive dissonance and political attitudes in Sweden and the United States pp. 235-249 Mikael Elinder Shmuel Nitzan: Collective preference and choice pp. 251-252 Daniel Sutter Timothy Besley, Torsten Person: Pillars of prosperity: the political economics of development clusters pp. 253-255 Claudia R. Williamson Peter J. Boettke: Living economics: yesterday, today, and tomorrow pp. 257-259 Richard E. Wagner Erratum to: Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements pp. 261-261 Pierre Courtois and Guillaume Haeringer
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