Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation
Philipp C. Bleek (pbleek@miis.edu) and
Eric B. Lorber
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Philipp C. Bleek: Graduate School of International Policy and Management, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA, USA
Eric B. Lorber: International Trade and Compliance Practice Group, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Washington, D.C.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2014, vol. 58, issue 3, 429-454
Abstract:
As Iran continues its apparent pursuit of a nuclear weapons breakout capability and North Korea resists efforts to roll back its proliferation, policy makers in Washington eager to prevent further proliferation in both regions regard security guarantees to allies as crucial tools. But recent scholarship calls into question whether security guarantees ameliorate proliferation risks. Relying on a combination of large-N quantitative analysis and a case study of South Korea from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, this article argues that, consistent with policy makers’ conventional wisdom, security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity among their recipients.
Keywords: nuclear proliferation; alliances; security guarantees; extended deterrence; South Korea (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:58:y:2014:i:3:p:429-454
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