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Social Choice and Welfare
1984 - 2013
Edited by John Duggan , Marc Fleurbaey , Wulf Gaertner and Maurice Salles
from Springer
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Volume 14, issue 4 , 1997
Hansson's theorem for generalized social welfare functions: an extension pp. 471-478 John Duggan Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case pp. 479-502 John Roemer Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras pp. 503-512 H. Reiju Mihara Non-cooperative implementation of the core pp. 513-525 Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra A note on the existence of progressive tax structures pp. 527-543 Efe A. Ok Modeling large electorates with Fourier series, with applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and directional models of spatial competition pp. 545-562 Bernard Grofman and Samuel Merrill III. Volume 14, issue 3 , 1997
Equitable agendas: agendas ensuring identical sincere and sophisticated voting decisions pp. 363-377 K. B. Reid Strategy-proofness on Euclidean spaces pp. 379-401 T. Storcken , Hans J.M. Peters , H. v. d. Stel and W. Peremans Rational choice and revealed preference without binariness pp. 403-425 Klaus D. Nehring A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation pp. 427-438 Ignacio OrtuÓo-OrtÎn Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria pp. 439-447 Sang-Chul Suh Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote: A comment pp. 449-464 Randolph Sloof Book Review: John Broome: Counting the Cost of Global Warming. The White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1992 pp. 465-467 Peter J Hammond Book Review: W.A. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles, N.J. Schofield (eds.): Social choice, welfare and ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995.ISBN 0-521-44340 pp. 468-470 Donald E. Campbell Volume 14, issue 2 , 1997
Social choice and resource allocation: a topological perspective pp. 147-160 Geoffrey Heal Market arbitrage, social choice and the core pp. 161-198 Graciela Chichilnisky Topological and discrete social choice: in a search of a theory pp. 199-209 Yuliy M. Baryshnikov Informational geometry of social choice pp. 211-232 Donald G. Saari Topological methods in social choice: an overview pp. 233-243 Paras Mehta A note on continuous social choice pp. 245-248 Yuqing Zhou Strategy-proofness of continuous aggregation maps (*) pp. 249-257 Heine Rasmussen The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games (*) pp. 259-294 Graciela Chichilnisky and Geoffrey Heal Homotopy properties of Pareto aggregation rules pp. 295-302 Gleb Koshevoy Social choice with infinite populations: construction of a rule and impossibility results pp. 303-318 Graciela Chichilnisky and Geoffrey Heal Topological aggregation, the case of an infinite population pp. 319-332 Luc Lauwers Topological aggregation of preferences: the case of a continuum of agents pp. 333-343 E. IndurÂin , J. C. Candeal and Graciela Chichilnisky Continuity and equity with infinite horizons pp. 345-356 Luc Lauwers A note on weak \infty-Chichilnisky rules pp. 357-358 Luc Lauwers Some issues related to the topological aggregation of preferences: addendum (*) pp. 359-361 Esteban Induráin , José Ramón Uriarte and Juan Carlos Candeal Volume 14, issue 1 , 1996
The dynamic transformation of political systems through social contract: a game theoretic approach pp. 1-21 Koichi Suga , Akira Okada and Kenichi Sakakibara Election of vice-president and adding new members to representative bodies pp. 23-45 Andranick S. Tanguiane Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies pp. 47-56 James Schummer Equitable opportunities in economic environments pp. 57-64 Laurence Kranich Reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems pp. 65-78 John Patrick Conley , Simon Wilkie and Richard P. McLean Objective interpersonal comparisons of utility pp. 79-96 Kevin Roberts Opportunity sets and individual well-being pp. 97-112 Walter Bossert Acyclic sets of linear orders pp. 113-124 Peter Fishburn Outranking methods for multicriterion decision making: Arrow's and Raynaud's conjecture pp. 125-128 Zachary F. Lansdowne Utilities, preferences, and substantive goods pp. 129-145 John C. Harsanyi Volume 13, issue 4 , 1996
Identification of domain restrictions over which acyclic, continuous-valued, and positive responsive social choice rules operate pp. 383-395 Ryo-ichi Nagahisa Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games pp. 397-417 Steven J. Brams and Peter C. Fishburn Incomplete information and incentives to free ride pp. 419-432 Mehmet Bac Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information pp. 433-444 Lu Hong Trade-off between equity and efficiency in a general economy with indivisible goods pp. 445-450 Koichi Tadenuma Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments pp. 451-455 Michel Le Breton and Guillaume Idriss Hollard Voting power when using preference ballots pp. 457-465 Duncan J. Melville and Deanna B. Haunsperger Implementation in generic environments pp. 467-478 Arunava Sen and James Bergin Justification of the simple majority and chairman rules pp. 479-486 Drora Karotkin Social welfare functions and fairness pp. 487-496 Edi Karni Volume 13, issue 3 , 1996
Majority-consistent preference orderings pp. 259-267 John Craven A note on restricted majority rules: invariance to rule selection and outcome distinctiveness pp. 269-274 Drora Karotkin and Shmuel Nitzan Sophisticated voting rules: the case of two tournaments pp. 275-289 Sanjay Srivastava and Michael A. Trick Improvement indices of well-being (*) pp. 291-303 Kai-yuen Tsui Transitivity and fuzzy preferences pp. 305-318 Rajat Deb and Manabendra Dasgupta Reconciling interpersonal comparability and the intensity of preference for the utility sum rule pp. 319-325 Ben Fine Partially efficient voting by committees pp. 327-342 Ken-Ichi Shimomura Redistribution and compensation (*) pp. 343-355 Marc Fleurbaey and Walter Bossert Actions of symmetry groups pp. 357-364 Graciela Chichilnisky The plurality majority converse under single peakedness pp. 365-380 Thom Bezembinder Erratum pp. 381-381 Graciela Chichilnisky Volume 13, issue 2 , 1996
Special issue: incommensurability and value pp. 127-127 Maurice Salles Quasi-orderings and population ethics pp. 129-150 Charles Blackorby , Walter Bossert and David Donaldson The theory of justice pp. 151-182 Serge-Christophe Kolm The nature and measurement of freedom pp. 183-200 Patrick Suppes Explaining risky choices without assuming preferences pp. 201-213 Chris Starmer Social choice with procedural preferences pp. 215-230 Sven Hansson An axiomatic approach to sustainable development pp. 231-257 Graciela Chichilnisky Volume 13, issue 1 , 1996
A robust theory of resource allocation pp. 1-10 Graciela Chichilnisky A remark on a social choice problem pp. 11-16 Beth Allen Finite sensibility and utility functions pp. 25-41 Gerhard Sichelstiel and Fritz Söllner Equilibrium in abstract political economies: with an application to a public good economy with voting pp. 43-50 Hideo Konishi New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules pp. 51-59 Nir Dagan Bargaining with set-valued disagreement pp. 61-74 Kaushik Basu Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions pp. 75-93 Gilbert Laffond , Jean Lainé and Jean-François Laslier Arrow theorems in mixed goods, stochastic, and dynamic economic environments pp. 95-112 James Redekop Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods pp. 113-126 Carmen Bevia
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