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Social Choice and Welfare

1984 - 2015

Current editor(s): John Duggan, Marc Fleurbaey, Wulf Gaertner and Maurice Salles

from Springer
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Volume 18, issue 4, 2001

An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions pp. 619-653 Downloads
Salvador Barberà
A crash course in implementation theory pp. 655-708 Downloads
Matthew Jackson
The probability of ties with scoring methods: Some results pp. 709-735 Downloads
Thierry Marchant
Optimal decision rules for fixed-size committees in polychotomous choice situations pp. 737-746 Downloads
Ruth Ben-Yashar and Jacob Paroush
The political viability of a negative income tax pp. 747-757 Downloads
Jon R. Neill
Core concepts for share vectors pp. 759-784 Downloads
Gerard van der Laan and Rene van den Brink
Strategyproof single unit award rules pp. 785-798 Downloads
Szilvia Papai
Horizontal inequity comparisons pp. 799-816 Downloads
Valentino Dardanoni and Peter Lambert
Nondictatorially independent pairs and Pareto pp. 817-822 Downloads
Robert C. Powers
Using elections to represent preferences pp. 823-831 Downloads
Vicki Knoblauch

Volume 18, issue 3, 2001

An interview with John C. Harsanyi pp. 389-401 Downloads
Peter Hammond and Claude d'Aspremont
A nail-biting election pp. 409-414 Downloads
Steven Brams and Peter C. Fishburn
Analyzing a nail-biting election pp. 415-430 Downloads
Donald G. Saari
The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting pp. 431-464 Downloads
Moshé Machover and Dan S. Felsenthal
The value of a player in n-person games pp. 465-483 Downloads
Matthias Mohr and Kjell Hausken
Review of Ethics out of Economics by John Broome pp. 485-495 Downloads
Nicolas Gravel
Welfare-reducing growth despite individual and government optimization pp. 497-506 Downloads
Siang Ng and Yew-Kwang Ng
Aggregation of coarse preferences pp. 507-525 Downloads
Herve Cres
Locating libraries on a street pp. 527-541 Downloads
Eiichi Miyagawa
Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof pp. 543-553 Downloads
H. Mihara
Stable sets and standards of behaviour pp. 555-570 Downloads
Robert Delver and Herman Monsuur
Constitutions, voting and democracy: A review pp. 571-600 Downloads
Norman Schofield
The Strong No Show Paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences pp. 601-616 Downloads
Joaquín Pérez

Volume 18, issue 2, 2001

Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus pp. 213-226 Downloads
Peter Fristrup and Hans Keiding
On the topological social choice problem pp. 227-250 Downloads
Charles D. Horvath
A linear algebra approach to non-transitive expected utility pp. 251-267 Downloads
Vesna Omladic and Matjaz Omladic
A cognitive model of individual well-being pp. 269-288 Downloads
Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler
Characterizing uncertainty aversion through preference for mixtures pp. 289-301 Downloads
Peter Klibanoff
Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information pp. 303-326 Downloads
John Nachbar
On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation pp. 327-386 Downloads
William Thomson

Volume 18, issue 1, 2001

From Arrow to cycles, instability, and chaos by untying alternatives pp. 1-22 Downloads
Thomas Schwartz
Ranking opportunity sets: An approach based on the preference for flexibility pp. 23-36 Downloads
Ricardo Arlegi and Jorge Nieto
Strategy-proofness and markets pp. 37-58 Downloads
Mark A. Satterthwaite
Social Welfare Functions which preserve distances pp. 59-64 Downloads
Fritz Grafe and Julius Grafe
Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments pp. 65-78 Downloads
Michel Le Breton and John Duggan
A comparison of Dodgson's method and Kemeny's rule pp. 79-89 Downloads
Thomas C. Ratliff
A continuous time model of the bandwagon effect in collective action pp. 91-105 Downloads
Arieh Gavious and Shlomo Mizrahi
A pedagogical proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem pp. 107-112 Downloads
Valentino Dardanoni
Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: The fixed agenda framework pp. 113-127 Downloads
Josep E. Peris and Carmen Sánchez M.
A note on monotonicity in iterated choice functions pp. 129-134 Downloads
Sylvain J. Durand
Core in a simple coalition formation game pp. 135-153 Downloads
Tayfun Sönmez, Suryapratim Banerjee and Hideo Konishi
The robustness of optimal organizational architectures: A note on hierarchies and polyarchies pp. 155-163 Downloads
Ruth Ben-Yashar and Shmuel Nitzan
Poverty orderings: A graphical illustration pp. 165-178 Downloads
Buhong Zheng
More on preference and freedom pp. 179-191 Downloads
Antonio Romero-Medina
Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference pp. 193-205 Downloads
Fabrice Valognes and William V. Gehrlein

Volume 17, issue 4, 2000

A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies pp. 571-599 Downloads
Naoki Yoshihara
Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation pp. 601-627 Downloads
Philippe De Donder
Extended preferences and freedom of choice pp. 629-637 Downloads
Shmuel Nitzan and Eyal Baharad
Characterizations of Lorenz curves and income distributions pp. 639-653 Downloads
Rolf Aaberge
Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule pp. 655-672 Downloads
Francesco De Sinopoli
Aggregation of fuzzy preferences: Some rules of the mean pp. 673-690 Downloads
José Luis García-Lapresta and Bonifacio Llamazares
Changes that cause changes pp. 691-705 Downloads
Donald G. Saari and Vincent Merlin
A historical introduction to normative economics pp. 707-738 Downloads
Serge-Christophe Kolm
Social choice with independent subgroup utility scales pp. 739-748 Downloads
John Weymark and Anna B. Khmelnitskaya

Volume 17, issue 3, 2000

Does the Borda rule provide more than a ranking? pp. 381-391 Downloads
Thierry Marchant
Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives pp. 393-402 Downloads
H. Mihara
A geometric examination of Kemeny's rule pp. 403-438 Downloads
Donald G. Saari and Vincent Merlin
When policy advisors cannot reach a consensus pp. 439-461 Downloads
Otto Swank, Wilko Letterie and Hendrik van Dalen
Institutional innovation, contingency and war: A review pp. 463-479 Downloads
Norman Schofield
Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions pp. 481-506 Downloads
Antonio Quesada
Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems pp. 507-521 Downloads
Youngsub Chun
Strategy-proofness and efficiency in a simple production economy pp. 523-532 Downloads
Sungwhee Shin and Sang-Chul Suh
Negatively interdependent preferences pp. 533-558 Downloads
Efe Ok and Levent KoÚkesen
A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set pp. 559-565 Downloads
Mathieu Martin
Book review pp. 567-569 Downloads
Maurice Salles

Volume 17, issue 2, 2000

A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem pp. 189-199 Downloads
Ruth Ben-Yashar and Jacob Paroush
An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money pp. 201-215 Downloads
Flip Klijn
Consistency, dummy and independence of irrelevant strategies for strategic games pp. 217-222 Downloads
Indrajit Ray
Intermediate inequality and welfare pp. 223-239 Downloads
Coral del Rio Otero and Javier Ruiz-Castillo
Size and distributional uncertainty, public information and the information paradox pp. 241-246 Downloads
Hans Gersbach
Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity pp. 247-267 Downloads
Steven Brams and Peter C. Fishburn
Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives pp. 269-282 Downloads
Jean-François Laslier
Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies pp. 283-292 Downloads
Jean-François Laslier
Consistency between tastes and values: A universalization approach pp. 293-320 Downloads
Nicolas Gravel, Jean-François Laslier and Alain Trannoy
Welfarism and information invariance pp. 321-336 Downloads
Walter Bossert
Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society pp. 337-365 Downloads
S. Tangian A.
Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences pp. 367-375 Downloads
Klaus Nehring

Volume 17, issue 1, 2000

Information and preference aggregation pp. 3-24 Downloads
Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly
Public information and social choice pp. 25-31 Downloads
Hans Gersbach
On the structure of simple preference-based choice functions pp. 33-43 Downloads
Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Kunal Sengupta
Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution pp. 45-53 Downloads
Marco Mariotti
An optimal auction perspective on lobbying pp. 55-68 Downloads
Richard Boylan
Collusion, renegotiation and implementation pp. 69-83 Downloads
Sandeep Baliga and Sandro Brusco
Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized pp. 85-93 Downloads
John Duggan and Thomas Schwartz
Interpersonal comparisons of utility and the policy paralysis problem pp. 95-115 Downloads
Michael Mandler
The benefit and sacrifice principles of taxation: A synthesis pp. 117-124 Downloads
Jon R. Neill
Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism pp. 125-141 Downloads
Guoqiang Tian
Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition pp. 143-155 Downloads
C. Huang H. and Vincent C. H. Chua
Representatives and districts pp. 157-178 Downloads
Brendan O'Flaherty
Book Review pp. 179-188 Downloads
Donald G. Saari
Page updated 2015-08-29