Theoretical Economics

2006 - Forthcoming

Current editor(s): Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Pablo Kurlat, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra

From Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Editor Theoretical Economics ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Forthcoming

Naive calibration

Yair Antler and Benjamin Bachi

How to segment a search market: information design and directed search

Teddy Mekonnen

Markovian persuasion

Ehud Lehrer and Dimitry Shaiderman

Evidence and skepticism in verifiable disclosure games

Daniel Rappoport

Transparent matching mechanisms

Markus Möller

Existence of a non-stationary equilibrium in search-and-matching models: tu and ntu

Christopher Sandmann and Nicolas Bonneton

Fostering collaboration

Joyee Deb, Aditya V. Kuvalekar and Elliot Lipnowski

Time consistency, temporal resolution indifference and the separation of time and risk

Felix Kubler, Larry Selden and Xiao Wei

Chaos and unpredictability with time inconsistent policy makers

Marco Battaglini

Competitive and revenue-optimal pricing with budgets

Simon Finster, Paul W. Goldberg and Edwin Lock

Coordination with sequential information acquisition

Xiaoye Liao and Michal Szkup

Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence

Elchanan Ben-Porath, Eddie Dekel and Barton L. Lipman

Safe implementation

Malachy J. Gavan and Antonio Penta

Strategic exits in stochastic partnerships: the curse of profitability

Boli Xu

Ex-post approaches to prioritarianism and sufficientarianism

Matthew D. Adler, Walter Bossert, Susumu Cato and Kohei Kamaga

Screening for breakthroughs

Gregorio Curello and Ludvig Sinander

Commonality of information and commonality of beliefs

Yu Awaya and Vijay Krishna

Probabilistic verification in mechanism design

Ian Ball and Deniz Kattwinkel

Non-recursive dynamic incentives: a rate of convergence approach

Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky

Lemonade from lemons: information design and adverse selection

Navin Kartik and Weijie Zhong

Bayesian games with nested information

Royi Jacobovic, Yehuda Levy and Eilon Solan

Choice or competition: does integration benefit everyone?

Yuichiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima

2025, volume 20, articles 3

Forward-looking experimentation of correlated alternatives

Yu Fu Wong

Sensitivity versus size: implications for tax competition

David Agrawal, Adib Bagh and Mohammed Mardan

Weight-ranked divide-and-conquer contracts

Lester T. Chan

Priority search with outside options

Jaehong Kim, Mengling Li and Menghan Xu

Unified gross substitutes and inverse isotonicity for equilibrium problems

Alfred Galichon, Larry Samuelson and Lucas Vernet

Stochastic impatience and the separation of time and risk preferences

David Dillenberger, Daniel Gottlieb and Pietro Ortoleva

Antimonotonicity for preference axioms: the natural counterpart to comonotonicity

Giulio Principi, Peter Wakker and Ruodu Wang

Tropical analysis: with an application to indivisible goods

Nicholas Charles Bedard and Jacob K Goeree

Empirical welfare economics

Christopher Chambers and Federico Echenique

Tâtonnement in matching markets

Alexander Westkamp

2025, volume 20, articles 2

Queueing to learn

Chiara Margaria

Optimal taxation with multiple incomes and types

Kevin Spiritus, Etienne Lehmann, Sander Renes and Floris T. Zoutman

Random utility coordination games on networks

Marcin Pęski

Adversarial coordination and public information design

Nicolas A. Inostroza and Alessandro Pavan

Games with information constraints: seeds and spillovers

Simone Galperti and Jacopo Perego

To infinity and beyond: a general framework for scaling economic theories

Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Scott Kominers and Ran I. Shorrer

Adoption epidemics and viral marketing

David McAdams and Yangbo Song

Private sunspots in games of coordinated attack

Yuliyan Mitkov

An analytical model of search and bargaining with divisible money

Kazuya Kamiya and So Kubota

Efficient and strategy-proof mechanism under general constraints

Kenzo Imamura and Yasushi Kawase

2025, volume 20, articles 1

Reputation building under uncertain monitoring

Joyee Deb and Yuhta Ishii

Expected balanced uncertain utility

Simon Grant, Berend Roorda and Jingni Yang

Dynamic assignment without money: optimality of spot mechanisms

Julien Combe, Vladyslav Nora and Olivier Tercieux

Gradual learning from incremental actions

Tuomas Laiho, Pauli Murto and Julia Salmi

Dynamic economics with quantile preferences

Luciano I. de Castro, Antonio Galvao and Daniel da Siva Nunes

Randomized collective choices based on a fractional tournament

Yves Sprumont

Repeated trade with imperfect information about previous transactions

Francesc Dilme

In the shadow of shadow banking: a liquidity perspective

Zehao Liu, Ping He and Chengbo Xie

The hazards and benefits of condescension in social learning

Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller, Farzad Pourbabaee and Omer Tamuz

On the limitations of data-based price discrimination

Haitian Xie, Ying Zhu and Denis Shishkin