Theoretical Economics
2006 - Forthcoming
Edited by Jeffrey C. Ely, Edward Green, Barton L. Lipman, and Martin J. Osborne
from Society for Economic Theory
Series data maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().
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Forthcoming
- Subjective expected utility in games

- Alfredo Di Tillio
- Credible ratings

- Ettore Damiano, Hao Li and Wing Suen
- Many inspections are manipulable

- Eran Shmaya
2008
- Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics

- Daisuke Oyama, Satoru Takahashi and Josef Hofbauer
- Repeated games with incomplete information on one side

- Marcin Peski
- Non-Bayesian updating: A theoretical framework

- Larry G. Epstein, Jawwad Noor and Alvaro Sandroni
- Equilibrium concepts in the large-household model

- Tao Zhu
- Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces

- Attila Ambrus and Satoru Takahashi
- Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup

- Rui R. Zhao
- Caller Number Five and related timing games

- Andreas Park and Lones Smith
- "Topologies on types": Correction

- Executive Board
2007
- Contracts and uncertainty pp. 1-13

- Alvaro Sandroni and Wojciech Olszewski
- Interim correlated rationalizability pp. 15-40

- Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and Stephen Morris
- Party platforms in electoral competition with heterogeneous constituencies pp. 41-70

- Thomas Kittsteiner and Erik Eyster
- Delay aversion pp. 71-113

- Efe Ok and Benoît, Jean-Pierre
- Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations

- Susan Athey and David A. Miller
- Valuation equilibrium

- Philippe Jehiel and Dov Samet
- Updating preferences with multiple priors

- Peter Klibanoff and Eran Hanany
- Coarse contingencies and ambiguity

- Larry Epstein, Massimo Marinacci and Kyoungwon Seo
- Secure implementation

- Tomas Sjostrom, Takehiko Yamato and Tatsuyoshi Saijo
- Noisy talk

- Oliver James Board, Andreas Blume and Kohei Kawamura
- A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence

- Wojciech Olszewski and Chung, Kim-Sau
- Complementarities in information acquisition with short-term trades

- Christophe Chamley
- Incomplete markets with no Hart points

- Robert M. Anderson and Roberto C. Raimondo
- Can intergenerational equity be operationalized?

- William R. Zame
- Cold feet

- Larry Epstein and Igor Kopylov
- Two-fund separation in dynamic general equilibrium

- Karl Schmedders
2006
- Editorial pp. 1-2

- Executive Board
- A model of choice from lists pp. 3-17

- Ariel Rubinstein and Yuval Salant
- Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability pp. 19-65

- Jeffrey Ely and Marcin Peski
- Financial equilibrium with career concerns pp. 67-93

- Andrea Prat and Amil Dasgupta
- Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types pp. 95-118

- Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale
- Information, evolution and utility pp. 119-142

- Jeroen Swinkels and Larry Samuelson
- Competitive markets with externalities pp. 143-166

- William R. Zame and Mitsunori Noguchi
- Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria pp. 167-206

- Robert Butler Wilson and Srihari Govindan
- Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations pp. 207-231

- Ran Spiegler
- A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets pp. 233-273

- Federico Echenique and Jorge Oviedo
- Topologies on types pp. 275-309

- Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and Stephen Morris
- Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring pp. 311-340

- George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
- Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent pp. 341-367

- Dean P. Foster and H. Peyton Young
- Ex post implementation in environments with private goods pp. 369-393

- Sushil Bikhchandani
- A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach pp. 395-410

- Ariel Rubinstein and Jacob Glazer
- Optimal auctions with ambiguity pp. 411-438

- Subir Bose, Emre Ozdenoren and Andreas Pape
- Endogenous incomplete markets, enforcement constraints, and intermediation pp. 439-459

- Arpad J. Abraham and Eva Carceles-Poveda
- Group formation and voter participation pp. 461-487

- Helios Herrera and Cesar Martinelli