Theoretical Economics

2006 - Forthcoming

Edited by Jeffrey C. Ely, Edward Green, Barton L. Lipman, Martin J. Osborne, and Debraj Ray

from Society for Economic Theory
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Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics: William H. Sandholm
Orders of limits for stationary distributions, stochastic dominance, and stochastic stability: William H. Sandholm
Nash implementation with little communication: Ilya R. Segal

Strategy-proofness and single-crossing pp. 127-163: Alejandro Saporiti
Asymptotic ordinal inefficiency of random serial dictatorship pp. 165-197: Mihai Manea
Choice deferral and ambiguity aversion pp. 199-225: Igor Kopylov
A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem pp. 227-252: Balazs Szentes and Yukio Koriyama

Coalition formation under power relations pp. 1-15: Ronny Razin and Michele Piccione
The Coase conjecture with incomplete information on the monopolist's commitment pp. 17-44: KyungMin Kim
Robust virtual implementation pp. 45-88: Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Monopolistic group design with peer effects pp. 89-125: Simon Board

Contagion through learning pp. 431-458: Jakub Steiner and Colin Stewart
Consumer optimism and price discrimination pp. 459-497: Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler
Risk taking and gender in hierarchies pp. 499-524: Suzanne Scotchmer
Price dispersion and loss leaders pp. 525-537: Jonathan Weinstein and Attila Ambrus

Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics pp. 155-192: Daisuke Oyama, Satoru Takahashi and Josef Hofbauer
Non-Bayesian updating: A theoretical framework pp. 193-229: Larry Epstein, Jawwad Noor and Alvaro Sandroni
Caller Number Five and related timing games pp. 231-256: Andreas Park and Lones Smith
Equilibrium concepts in the large-household model pp. 257-281: Tao Zhu
"Topologies on types": Correction pp. 283-285: Siyang Xiong and Yi-Chun Chen

Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces pp. 1-27: Attila Ambrus and Satoru Takahashi
Repeated games with incomplete information on one side pp. 29-84: Marcin Peski
Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup pp. 85-121: Rui Zhao
Nonlinear pricing, market coverage, and competition pp. 123-153: Huanxing Yang and Lixin Ye

Coarse contingencies and ambiguity pp. 355-394: Larry Epstein, Massimo Marinacci and Kyoungwon Seo
Noisy talk pp. 395-440: Oliver James Board, Andreas Blume and Kohei Kawamura
Complementarities in information acquisition with short-term trades pp. 441-467: Christophe Chamley
A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence pp. 469-487: Wojciech Olszewski and Chung, Kim-Sau

Secure implementation pp. 203-229: Tomas Sjostrom, Takehiko Yamato and Tatsuyoshi Saijo
Cold feet pp. 231-259: Larry Epstein and Igor Kopylov
Updating preferences with multiple priors pp. 261-298: Peter Klibanoff and Eran Hanany
Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations pp. 299-354: Susan Athey and David A. Miller

Incomplete markets with no Hart points pp. 115-133: Robert M. Anderson and Roberto C. Raimondo
Two-fund separation in dynamic general equilibrium pp. 135-161: Karl Schmedders
Valuation equilibrium pp. 163-185: Philippe Jehiel and Dov Samet
Can intergenerational equity be operationalized? pp. 187-202: William R. Zame

Contracts and uncertainty pp. 1-13: Alvaro Sandroni and Wojciech Olszewski
Interim correlated rationalizability pp. 15-40: Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and Stephen Morris
Party platforms in electoral competition with heterogeneous constituencies pp. 41-70: Thomas Kittsteiner and Erik Eyster
Delay aversion pp. 71-113: Efe Ok and BenoÃ®t, Jean-Pierre

A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach pp. 395-410: Ariel Rubinstein and Jacob Glazer
Optimal auctions with ambiguity pp. 411-438: Subir Bose, Emre Ozdenoren and Andreas Pape
Endogenous incomplete markets, enforcement constraints, and intermediation pp. 439-459: Arpad J. Abraham and Eva Carceles-Poveda
Group formation and voter participation pp. 461-487: Helios Herrera and Cesar Martinelli

Topologies on types pp. 275-309: Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and Stephen Morris
Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring pp. 311-340: George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent pp. 341-367: Dean P. Foster and H. Peyton Young
Ex post implementation in environments with private goods pp. 369-393: Sushil Bikhchandani

Competitive markets with externalities pp. 143-166: William R. Zame and Mitsunori Noguchi
Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria pp. 167-206: Robert Butler Wilson and Srihari Govindan
Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations pp. 207-231: Ran Spiegler
A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets pp. 233-273: Federico Echenique and Jorge Oviedo

Editorial pp. 1-2: Executive Board
A model of choice from lists pp. 3-17: Ariel Rubinstein and Yuval Salant
Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability pp. 19-65: Jeffrey Ely and Marcin Peski
Financial equilibrium with career concerns pp. 67-93: Andrea Prat and Amil Dasgupta
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types pp. 95-118: Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale
Information, evolution and utility pp. 119-142: Jeroen Swinkels and Larry Samuelson