The Draft and the Quality of Military Personnel

Timothy J. Perri

No 10-05, Working Papers from Department of Economics, Appalachian State University

Abstract: It has been argued the draft may enable the military to attract more able individuals than a volunteer military, and thus increase welfare. In our theoretical model, we find this may be the case if a volunteer military simply takes the least able individuals. When the military tests individuals and does not take the lowest quality applicants, neither a random draft nor a draft with testing increases welfare, and both usually decrease welfare. Only if testing is relatively costly would a random draft dominate a volunteer military with testing. Key Words:

Date: 2010
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