Suitability of Capital Allocations for Performance Measurement

Eduard Kromer and Ludger Overbeck

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Capital allocation principles are used in various contexts in which a risk capital or a cost of an aggregate position has to be allocated among its constituent parts. We study capital allocation principles in a performance measurement framework. We introduce the notation of suitability of allocations for performance measurement and show under different assumptions on the involved reward and risk measures that there exist suitable allocation methods. The existence of certain suitable allocation principles generally is given under rather strict assumptions on the underlying risk measure. Therefore we show, with a reformulated definition of suitability and in a slightly modified setting, that there is a known suitable allocation principle that does not require any properties of the underlying risk measure. Additionally we extend a previous characterization result from the literature from a mean-risk to a reward-risk setting. Formulations of this theory are also possible in a game theoretic setting.

Date: 2013-01, Revised 2014-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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