Inheritance, Equal Division and Rent Seeking

Roger Faith and Robert Tollison ()
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Roger Faith: W. P. Carey School of Business Department of Economics, http://wpcarey.asu.edu/Directory/stafffaculty.cfm?cobid=1039646

Working Papers from Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University

Abstract: We examine bequest-sharing rules where wasteful competition for bequests is possible by children. We show that equal division minimizes rent-seeking expenditures by siblings. Finally, we employ a theory of rational social norms in order to discuss the evolution of bequest norms in the Middle Ages from primogeniture to partible inheritances in some parts of Western Europe.

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