Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy

Matteo Triossi and Antonio Romero-Medina
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

No 22, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: The Ramón y Cajal Program promotes the hiring of top researchers in Spanish R&D centers and academic institutions. The centralized mechanism associated to the Program is analyzed. The paper models it as a two-sided matching market and studies if it provides the incentives to increase the quality of the researchers hired. We analyze the mechanism both under complete and incomplete information. The comparison of the theoretical findings with the available data points out that the mechanism provides poor incentives and does not prevent collusion between research departments and candidates in the hiring process.

Keywords: Matching Markets; Preagreements; Implementation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Converging to Efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program Experience (2007)
Working Paper: Converging to efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program experience (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:22

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