Opaque governance, special purpose vehicles, and the preacher´s waiver

Rodolfo Apreda ()

No 481, CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. from Universidad del CEMA

Abstract: This paper argues that special purpose vehicles, SPVs, are two-edged financial constructs whose bad edge consists in conveying opaque governance, whereas its good one amounts to interesting financial engineering. Firstly, the notion of opaque governance is highlighted, to focus next on SPVs and their governance. Afterwards, the paper delves into collateralized debt obligations and their facilitators, the offshore locations. Last, the failing role of some regulators and gatekeepers is emphasized with the purpose of setting up new measures to prevent them from claiming the Preacher’s waiver.

Keywords: opaque governance; special purpose vehicles; collateralized debt obligations; offshore locations; gatekeepers; regulators (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 G15 G21 G24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/documentos/481.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cem:doctra:481

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. from Universidad del CEMA
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Valeria Dowding ().