Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but not IIA

Donald Campbell () and Jerry Kelly ()
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Donald Campbell: Department of Economics, College of William and Mary
Jerry Kelly: Department of Economics, Syracuse University

No 38, Working Papers from Department of Economics, College of William and Mary

Abstract: In the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition disallows both anonymity and neutrality.

Keywords: Pareto; anonymity; neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
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