Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: taxing emissions or trading on permit markets?
Ludovic Julien (ludovic.julien@parisnanterre.fr),
Anicet Kabre and
Louis de Mesnard
No 2023-14, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX
Abstract:
We introduce polluting emissions in a sequential noncooperative oligopoly model of bilateral exchange. In one sector a leader and a follower use polluting technologies which create negative externalities on the payoffs of strategic traders who belong to the other sector. By modeling emissions as a negative externality, we show that the leader pollutes more (less) than the follower when strategies are substitutes (complements). Then, we consider the implementation of public policies to control the levels of emissions, namely two taxation mechanisms and a permit market. We study the effects of these public policies. Moreover, we determine the conditions under which these public policies can implement a Pareto-improving allocation.
Keywords: Stackelberg competition; pollution; fiscal policy; permit market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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https://economix.fr/pdf/dt/2023/WP_EcoX_2023-14.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: taxing emissions or trading on permit markets? (2023)
Working Paper: Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: taxing emissions or trading on permit markets? (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2023-14
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