Exchange rate reaction to international organization loans and geopolitical preferences

Hugo Oriola and Jamel Saadaoui

No 2025-2, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX

Abstract: This research provides novel empirical evidence about the exchange rate reaction to international organization loans and geopolitical preferences using an unbalanced panel of 153 countries observed from February 1993 to December 2019. For elected temporary members of the UN Security Council, the IMF loans cause a sizeable appreciation in the exchange rate vis-à-vis the USD of around 2 percent at the 12-month horizon, after controlling for institutional quality. ADB loans cause an appreciation of around 0.25 percent at the 4-month horizons. These effects are stronger when the geopolitical distance with China is higher, indicating a higher credibility for these loans.

Keywords: Exchange rates; Geopolitical preferences; International organization loans; Institutional quality; Local projections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 F30 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int, nep-mon and nep-opm
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Related works:
Journal Article: Exchange rate reaction to international organization loans and geopolitical preferences (2025)
Working Paper: Exchange rate reaction to international organization loans and geopolitical preferences (2025)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2025-2

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