Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information

Roger B. Myerson

No 659, Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: The core is extended to games with incomplete information. The feasible set is characterized by incentive-compatible mechanisms, and blocking may similarly be organized by an incentive compatible mediation plan. Nonemptiness is proven for games with a balanced structure

Keywords: core; incomplete information; virtual utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2004-08-11
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Journal Article: Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nasm04:659

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