Abstract:
The study is aimed to investigate the convergence to equilibrium of trajectories generated by contractual processes. “Contractual process” is a view on economy’s self-regulation, describing any state of exchange economy as a set of barter contracts among agents/coalitions. It is assumed that any moment of continuous time agents can partially break some contracts and sign more beneficial ones. Such reconstructing is called “benevolent”, when an agent/coalition breaks old contracts only when exhausting all other opportunities to increase welfare. Such processes are shown to con-verge to equilibrium under reasonable conditions, whereas non-benevolent processes need not converge, as shown by series of examples.
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