The Timing of Bids in Internet Auctions: Market Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents

Axel Ockenfels and Alvin Roth ()

Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Many bidders in eBay employ bidding strategies that involve late bids, incremental bids, or both. Based on field evidence, we discuss the manner in which late bids are caused both by sophisticated, strategic reasoning and by irrationality and inexperience, the interaction of late bidding and incremental bidding, and the relation between market design and artificial agent design.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-net and nep-rmg
Date: 2001-07
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