Non-Pecuniary Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration (Japanese)

Yumi Nishimura and Akira Kotera

Discussion Papers (Japanese) from Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)

Abstract: In light of several recent awards ordering host states to pay costly compensation, the concern not to chill and immobilize governmental action by the prospect of large damages awards by invest treaty arbitration has been felt. On the other hand, it is often said that compelling a state by an arbitration award to follow a particular course of conduct such as annulling the measures that it has taken is an undue interference with its policy making power, and that financial compensation should be preferred as the least intrusive remedy into the sensitive areas of state sovereignty. This paper assesses the pros and cons of the potential non-monetary relief in investment treaty arbitration and proposes a preferable provision on remedies to be inserted into future investment treaties.

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2014-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eti:rdpsjp:14006

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