 Congestion management rules and trading strategiesMô Dolores Furió Ortega and Julio Lucia López No 222, Studies on the Spanish Economy from FEDEA Abstract: This paper empirically investigates how the economic incentives embodied in the rules governing the resolution of transmission constraints in the Spanish wholesale electricity market have influenced the trading strategies spanning all the sections of the market followed by buyers and sellers. The results show several facts with far reaching consequences. First, participants in the spot market follow dynamic trading strategies that span all the sections of the market, i.e. their strategies take into account the effects of participation in one section of the market over another. Second, the results show the importance of the structure of economic incentives implied by the regulations in explaining the trading behaviour of market participants. In particular, producers seem to be able to recognize and exploit the consequences of their role in the resolution of transmission constraints, and buyers respond to the way congestion costs are billed to them. Third, participation in the resolution of transmission constraints does not affect the revenues of all production facilities in the same way, due to the different roles they play in the procedure, coupled with the asymmetric reward scheme. Finally, the results shed light on what should be expected of the recent reforms in the aforementioned rules. References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fda:fdaeee:222 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Studies on the Spanish Economy from FEDEA |
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