 Cyclical dumping and U.S. antidumping protection: 1980-2001No WP-07-21, Working Paper Series from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Abstract: In this paper, I test the theory that weak economic conditions in a foreign economy cause cyclical dumping, i.e., the temporary sale of products in a trading partner's economy at a price below average total cost. Although I am unable to observe prices or costs directly, a novel identification strategy allows me to uncover evidence of cyclical dumping. Using country- specific information on foreign economic shocks in manufacturing industries, filing decisions by the US industry, and antidumping decisions by the US government, I am able to identify strong evidence of cyclical dumping. After controlling for other factors that likely drive industry filing and government decisions, I find that a one standard deviation fall in the growth of employment in a foreign economy's manufacturing industry quadruples the joint probability that the US industry will file an antidumping petition and the US government will impose a preliminary (temporary) antidumping measure. Further, a one standard deviation fall in foreign employment growth more than doubles the joint probability that a petition will be filed and a final (long-lasting) antidumping measure will be imposed. Keywords: Antidumping; duties (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-07-21 Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Working Paper Series from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Contact information at EDIRC. |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.