Trade and Security, 1:Anarchy

James Anderson () and Douglas Marcouiller

Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers from Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Abstract: Market exchange is subject to an endogenously-determined level of predation which impedes specialization and gains from trade. Utility-maximizing agents opt between careers in specialized production and careers in predation. Three types of equilibria may emerge, autarky, an insecure exchange equilibrium, or a secure exchange equilibrium.

Keywords: TRADE; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F1 D58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Working Paper: Trade and Security,I: Anarchy (1997)
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