Firm's Network versus Board Members' Network: Who to Appoint?

Thomas Vallee and Joël Massol
Additional contact information
Joël Massol: LEMNA - Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique - IEMN-IAE Nantes - Institut d'Économie et de Management de Nantes - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Nantes - UN - Université de Nantes

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: A crucial question at the center of corporate governance theories and of the literature on social networks alike is the sense of empower of prestige, or influence on the actors of a social network. This paper approaches the possibility of measuring this influence by detecting key individuals who support network dynamics. By means of a study conducted on a sample of CAC 40 directors, it will be shown that the most influential elements are not necessarily the best placed at the beginning. Contrary to all expectations, a dynamics of influence is based on criteria of indispensability to the network that will be presented as an example.

Keywords: corporate governance; outside directors; networks of directors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03-13
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00829905
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00829905/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00829905

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().