Experimental comparison of compulsory and non compulsory arbitration mechanisms

Eric Guerci and Sylvie Thoron

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We run a series of experiments to compare the well known arbitration scheme FOA (Final Offer Arbitration) with a new arbitration scheme, non compulsory, we proposed in a companion paper (Tanimura and Thoron (2008)): ROC (Recursive Offer Conciliation). The two mechanisms are also compared with a negotiation without arbitration. We observe that the ROC mechanism seems to cumulate the advantages of the two other procedures, it avoids the high frequency of impasses observed under the FOA procedure and it is as efficient as the Free procedure in this respect. Furthermore, in an asymmetric treatment, it helps the subjects to find an agreement around the equal split of the surplus, like the arbitrator of the FOA procedure does, but without imposing anything on them.

Keywords: negotiation; bargaining; arbitration; Raiffa solution; chilling effect; dispute resolution; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04-08
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00584328
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