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Rémunération des dirigeants et Performance financière: une étude française

Mohamed Khenissi ()
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Mohamed Khenissi: COACTIS - COnception de l'ACTIon en Situation - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne

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Abstract: The objective of this paper is to estimate in France the sensitivity of executive compensation at the shareholder value creation. It is a replication of the method of Jensen and Murphy (1990) in a different institutional context. This replication allows us to compare French results with American results, what is interesting considering the differences of the institutional context, what could let anticipate considerable differences in the compensation policy. Thus, by following the political argument of Roe (2001), we should expect a Pay-Performance sensitivity lower in France than in the United States. According to our results, the compensation of CEO of French listed companies is positively related to shareholder wealth. In addition, and contrary to the policy assumption of Roe (2001), the global compensation of the French CEO has an incentive effect more important than in the American companies

Keywords: CEO compensation; Pay-Performance sensitivity; the social democracy; rémunération des dirigeants; performance de l'entreprise; sensibilité; social-démocratie (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-06-17
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00834608v1
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