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Enchérir ou négocier: quelle forme préférable de marché?

Sylvain Mignot and Annick Vignes ()
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Sylvain Mignot: LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: On some particular markets, people have the choice to sell (or buy) their merchandise through pairwise transactions or auctions. Each agent can use a market design one day and the other design the other day. From the empirical study of the Boulogne s/mer fish market, we show that, at a macro level, this organization is a stable one, significant quantities being traded on each sub-market every day. At a micro-level, it appears that agents have different strategies, some of them being mostly loyal to a particular mechanism when some others regularly switch. A third important result is that the most expensive species of fish are selling at a higher price through negotiation when the cheapest ones are sold at higher prices through auctions. This article then presents an agent-based model which help to understand under which conditions this particular organization is a stable one.

Keywords: fish market; price dispersion; micro data analysis; agent-based modelling; social networks.; marché au poisson; dispersion des prix; analyse de données micro; modélisation basé-agent; réseaux sociaux. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01299374v1
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