Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty

Helga Habis () and P. Jean-Jacques Herings ()

No 1120, IEHAS Discussion Papers from Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Abstract: We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TUgames are convex.

Keywords: transferable utility games; uncertainty; Weak Sequential Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
Date: 2011-05
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Related works:
Journal Article: Transferable utility games with uncertainty (2011)
Working Paper: Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty (2010)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:has:discpr:1120

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