Peer Effects and Social Networks in Education and Crime

Antoni Calvó-Armengol, Eleonora Patacchini and Yves Zenou ()

No 645, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: This paper studies whether structural properties of friendship networks affect individual outcomes in education and crime. We first develop a model that shows that, at the Nash equilibrium, the outcome of each individual embedded in a network is proportional to her Bonacich centrality measure. This measure takes into account both direct and indirect friends of each individual but puts less weight to her distant friends. Using a very detailed dataset of adolescent friendship networks, we show that, after controlling for observable individual characteristics and unobservable network specific factors, the individual's position in a network (as measured by her Bonacich centrality) is a key determinant of her level of activity. A standard deviation increase in the Bonocich centrality increases the level of individual delinquency by 45% of one standard deviation and the pupil school performance by 34% of one standard deviation.

Keywords: Centrality Measure; Peer Influence; Network Structure; Delinquency; School Performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 I21 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-law and nep-ure
Date: 2005-07-05
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Working Paper: Peer Effects and Social Networks in Education and Crime (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0645

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