Abstract:
Since the mid 90´s there has been an increased focus in media on public scandals in Swedish municipalities. This essay sets out to eludicate if there are reasons to believe that public corruption in Swedish municipalities is in fact increasing. By applying instruments from the institutional rational-choice genre, and by illustrating the main argument with empirical illustrations, the author draws the conclusion that there are compelling reasons to believe that organizational reforms during the last two decades – i.e. new public management – have shaped an incentive-structure which favours corrupt actitivies, hence increasing their frequency. The author concludes with a discussion on reform-strategies to counteract increasing corruption, and calls for extensive research on this under-researched topic.
More papers in Ratio Working Papers from The Ratio Institute Address: The Ratio Institute, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42 Stockholm, Sweden Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Niclas Berggren ().
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