International Conventions and Non-State Actors: Selection, Signaling, and Reputation Effects

Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (), Simon Hug (), Livia Isabella Schubiger () and Julian Wucherpfennig ()
Additional contact information
Kristian Skrede Gleditsch: Department of Government, University of Essex, UK
Simon Hug: Universit� de G�neve
Livia Isabella Schubiger: University of Zurich
Julian Wucherpfennig: University of Zurich

No 108, HiCN Working Papers from Households in Conflict Network

Abstract: Non-state actors (NSAs) play an important role in violent conflicts, but unlike state actors they cannot (be forced to) sign international conventions tying their hands. The nongovernmental organization Geneva Call has stepped into this void and solicits NSAs to sign and allow monitoring of conventions banning particular activities, for example the use of landmines. We propose a game-theoretic model to assess the motivations for NSAs (and states) to sign such conventions and how they affect conflict behavior on the ground. We find that selection issues are of crucial importance linked to the incentive to signal resolve, both by states and NSAs. Empirical analyses of conflict behavior in countries where Geneva Call has been active support the implications of the theoretical model.

Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2011-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hicn.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/wp1082.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hic:wpaper:108

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in HiCN Working Papers from Households in Conflict Network
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tilman Brück () and () and () and ().