Optimisation d’une stratégie anti-OPA par limitation linéaire des droits de vote face à un investisseur hostile
Bruno-Laurent Moschetto and
Frédéric Teulon
No 2014-410, Working Papers from Department of Research, Ipag Business School
Abstract:
This paper studies the rules that limit voting rights as a defensive measure against hostile takeovers. We consider atomistic shareholders and a small group of united minority shareholders, the hard core, that wants to block any hostile takeovers. This group constructs a device based on a threshold below which each share is linked to one vote and above which each share gives less than one vote, according to a coefficient of redistribution. It finds the optimal couple that blocks hostile takeovers while minimizing the negative impact on the market due to too strong protection of the hard core to the detriment of dispersed shareholders.
JEL-codes: G18 G30 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2014-01-01
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Journal Article: Optimisation d’une stratégie anti- opa par limitation linéaire des droits de vote face à un investisseur hostile (2015)
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