The Desirability of Workfare as a Welfare Ordeal – Revisited

Tomer Blumkin (), Yoram Margalioth () and Efraim Sadka ()
Additional contact information
Tomer Blumkin: Ben Gurion University
Yoram Margalioth: Tel Aviv University
Efraim Sadka: Tel Aviv University

No 5130, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In this paper we challenge the conventional wisdom that using workfare as a supplementary screening device to means-testing is socially undesirable when the government objective is welfarist, namely, to ensure that all members of society will attain some minimal level of utility. Our argument suggests that when misreporting of income by welfare claimants is sufficiently manifest, introducing work requirements for welfare eligibility economizes on government expenditure and is socially desirable.

Keywords: workfare; welfare; means-testing; misreporting; utility maintenance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 H2 H5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2010-08
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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