Pricing and Trust

Steffen Huck, Gabriele K. Ruchala and Jean-Robert Tyran ()
Additional contact information
Gabriele K. Ruchala: University College London

No 07-04, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: We experimentally examine the effects of flexible and fixed prices in markets for experience goods in which demand is driven by trust. With flexible prices, we observe low prices and high quality in competitive (oligopolistic) markets, and high prices coupled with low quality in non-competitive (monopolistic) markets. We then introduce a regulated intermediate price above the oligopoly price and below the monopoly price. The effect in monopolies is more or less in line with standard intuition. As price falls volume increases and so does quality, such that overall efficiency is raised by 50%. However, quite in contrast to standard intuition, we also observe an efficiency rise in response to regulation in oligopolies. Both, transaction volume and traded quality are, in fact, maximal in regulated oligopolies.

Keywords: markets; price competition; price regulation; reputation; trust; moral hazard; experience goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C90 D40 D80 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-exp, nep-mkt and nep-reg
Date: 2007-01
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.ku.dk/Research/Publications/pink/2007/0704.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Pricing and Trust (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0704

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics
Address: Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Henriette Aabo Hansen ().