Dalle disposizioni per la tutela del risparmio alla funzione della Compliance

Adalberto Alberici ()

Departmental Working Papers from Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano

Abstract: FROM ITALIAN BANKING LAW TO THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION IN BANKS. So far, investors’ confidence in financial markets has been protected by non-compulsory rules, which are more and more complex. Nevertheless, these provisions have not safeguarded banks and the whole financial system from legal and reputational risks, which have followed the recent industrial and financial crises. The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision and the Bank of Italy strongly recommend banks to manage risks arising from non-compliance to laws, regulations, self-regulation systems and operational policy. This issue is a key factor for improving banks’ relationship with the Supervisory Authority, with financial markets and investors. As a consequence, the introduction of a compliance function in banks’ internal auditing system should not represent a mere accomplishment to rules. On the contrary, it should spring from banks’ will to create value for all their stakeholders

Keywords: Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06-29
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2007-27

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