The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision Making Process

Giuseppe Albanese and Marco Sorge

No 2010_23, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: In this paper we investigate the role of judicial control of lobbying activities in an endogenous policy framework, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. We present a multi-layer lobbying model where a self-interested group is allowed to inuence a public decision maker – and possibly the judicial authority itself, which performs an anti-corruption task – with the payment of illegal contributions, and provide general conditions for the existence of a zero-contribution equilibrium. Furthermore, we study how sensitive the main findings are to different institutional arrangements as to judicial independence.

Keywords: Illegal lobbying; Endogenous policy making; Judicial control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 D78 H11 H49 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision‐Making Process (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_23

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