Les effets redistributifs des transferts en faveur des familles en France: un éclairage en longue période

Ai-Thu Dang () and Jean-Marie Monnier ()
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Ai-Thu Dang: MATISSE
Jean-Marie Monnier: MATISSE

Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyse how the criteria of horizontal and vertical equity of the French system of family transfers evolved from 1975 till 2002. It focuses primarily on non-contributory benefits and on income taxation and uses family type's methods. Two main findings can be outlined: firstly, the publicly financed compensation for dependents is better in 1975 than in 2002, especially for families on low or medium incomes. Secondly, the redistributive impact of the French system of family transfers has dropped. Otherwise, we also highlight that the predominant instruments are means-tested benefits in the low end of the revenue scale and income tax rates in the other hand

Keywords: French system of direct and indirect family transfers; horizontal equity; vertical equity; family quotient; target benefits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D39 D63 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2005-02
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Published in Pellet R., Finances publiques et redistribution sociale, Economica, 2006, pp.225-261

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mse:wpsorb:r05016

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