The Bankruptcy Problem: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach

Nir Dagan () and Oscar Volij ()

Economic theory and game theory from Nir Dagan

Abstract: We associate each bankruptcy problem with a bargaining problem and derive old allocation rules for the former by applying well known bargaining solutions to the latter.

Keywords: Bankruptcy; bargaining; allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993
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Published in Mathematical Social Sciences 26:287-297 (1993)

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Working Paper: The Bankruptcy Problem: A Cooperative Bargaining Approach (2003)
Journal Article: The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach (1993)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nid:ndagan:001

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Address: Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Management, Tel-Hai Academic College, Upper Galilee, Israel.
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