A full participation agreement on global emission reduction through strategic investments in R & D

Uwe Kratzsch, Gernot Sieg and Ulrike Stegemann

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: If an emission reduction agreement with participation of all players is not enforceable because politicians are too myopic or not able to commit themselves to sustainable policies or costs of reducing emis- sions are too high, strategic investments in research and development (R&D) of green technology, for example sustainable drive-trains, can pave the way for a future treaty. Although no player will rationally reduce emissions on its own, investments in R&D by at least one player can change the strategic situation of negotiations to control emissions: Emission abatement costs will decrease so that a treaty with full par- ticipation can be achieved in future periods through time consistent sustainable policies.

Keywords: emissions; discount factor; commitment; endogenous technical change; repeated prisoner’s dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F53 H41 O30 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-ino
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: A full participation agreement on global emission reduction through strategic investments in R&D (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:27188

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