Analysis of employment protection legislation: a model with endogenous labour productivity

Domenico Lisi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of the different Employment Protection Legislation on the workers choices on effort. The different EPL are modelled through an easy theoretical pattern, characterized by endogenous labour productivity. In particular, it is analyzed how the labour productivity is influenced by the incentives that the different EPL give workers. The model outcomes highlight that the recent reforms produce only a positive temporary effect on the unemployment level, as emphasized by the empirical evidence. Finally, this paper analyzes a new contractual regime in order to see if it could offer in theory a better solution in term of structural employment respect to known standard regimes.

Keywords: Employment Protection Legislation; Effort; Contractual Benchmark. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 J50 L59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: ANALYSYS OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION: A MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:27191

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