Институциональные ловушки и экономические реформы

Institutional Traps and Economic Reforms

Victor Polterovich
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Виктор Меерович Полтерович

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The theory of institutional traps, i.e. ineffective but stable institutions or behavior norms, is develope din connection with economic reforms. Mechanisms are described that cause a system to get into a trap and ways of going out of it are analyzed. Concepts of transformation costs and trasitional rents are introduced. As examples of institutional traps, considered are such institutions, as barter, non-payments, tax evasion, and corruption. A game-theoretic model of the barter trap is given.

Keywords: coordination failures; corruption; cultural inertia; institutional trap; multiple equilibria; path dependence; rent seeking; reputation; systemic crises; transaction costs; transformation costs; transitional rent; trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P20 P30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Economics and Mathematical Methods 2.35(1999): pp. 1-37

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Related works:
Journal Article: Институциональные ловушки и экономические реформы (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:27257

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