Government transparency and expenditure in the rent-seeking industry: the case of Japan for 1998-2004
Eiji Yamamura (cyl02111@nifty.com) and
Haruo Kondoh
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
Since the end of the 1990s, local governments in Japan have enacted Information Disclosure Ordinances, which require the disclosure of official government information. This paper uses Japanese prefecture-level data for the period 1998?2004 to examine how this enactment affected the rate of government construction expenditure. The Dynamic Panel model is used to control for unobserved prefecture-specific effects and endogenous bias. The major finding is that disclosure of government information reduces the rate of government construction expenditure. This implies that information disclosure reduces losses from rent-seeking activity, which is consistent with public choice theory.
Keywords: Information disclosure; Special interest group; Construction expenditure; Rent seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D78 H79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03-15
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29689/1/MPRA_paper_29689.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND EXPENDITURE IN THE RENT-SEEKING INDUSTRY: THE CASE OF JAPAN FOR 1998–2004 (2013)
Working Paper: Government transparency and expenditure in the rent-seeking industry: The case of Japan for 1998–2004 (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:29689
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