Nobody's innocent: the role of customers in the doping dilemma
Eike Emrich and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Berno Büchel ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
To which extent high performances in professional sports are based on the use of illicit substances or other doping practices is extremely difficult to measure empirically. Game-theoretical approaches predict strong incentives to dope based on the interaction among athletes (prisoner's dilemma) or the interaction between some control organization and the athletes (inspection game). The role of stakeholders such as customers, sponsors, and the media is either ignored or only informally discussed. One might think that customers who are ready to withdraw their support after a doping scandal, would reduce the incentives to dope. We explicitly model the strategic interaction of such customers with athletes and organizers and strongly refute this (optimistic) conjecture. Customers even trigger doping by putting a threat on the organizers not to conduct serious doping tests. However, we show that this result can be altered by a change in the information structure. If transparency about doping tests is established, then there is a doping-free equilibrium. This has practical implications for the design of anti-doping policies, as well as for other situations of fraudulent activities.
Keywords: inspection game; doping; professional sports; scandals; cheating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 K42 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44627/1/MPRA_paper_44627.pdf original version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:44627
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Joachim Winter ().