Action bias among elite soccer goalkeepers: The case of penalty kicks
Ofer Azar (),
Yael Keidar-Levin and
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
In soccer penalty kicks, goalkeepers choose their action before they can clearly observe the kick direction. An analysis of 286 penalty kicks in top leagues and championships worldwide shows that given the probability distribution of kick direction, the optimal strategy for goalkeepers is to stay in the goal's center. Goalkeepers, however, almost always jump right or left. We propose the following explanation for this behavior: because the norm is to jump, norm theory (Kahneman and Miller, 1986) implies that a goal scored yields worse feelings for the goalkeeper following inaction (staying in the center) than following action (jumping), leading to a bias for action. The omission bias, a bias in favor of inaction, is reversed here because the norm here is reversed - to act rather than to choose inaction. The claim that jumping is the norm is supported by a second study, a survey conducted with 32 top professional goalkeepers. The seemingly biased decision making is particularly striking since the goalkeepers have huge incentives to make correct decisions, and it is a decision they encounter frequently. Finally, we discuss several implications of the action/omission bias for economics and management.
Keywords: Decision Making; Uncertainty; Choice Behavior; Sport Psychology; Behavioral Economics; Action Bias; Omission Bias; Commission Bias; Action Effect; Inaction Effect; Actor Effect; Economic Psychology; Heuristics and Biases; Soccer; Goalkeepers; Penalty Kicks; Risk; Norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Z13 D81 D01 C93 A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4477/1/MPRA_paper_4477.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Action bias among elite soccer goalkeepers: The case of penalty kicks (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:4477
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Joachim Winter ().