Military Expenditures of Dictatorial Regimes: A Strategic Theory

Saito Tetsuya

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Unlike usual approaches to military expenditures that concentrate on foreign affairs, this paper analyzes a strategic structure for a dictatorialgovernment to plan military expenditures concenrrating on domestic affairs. Then we find two dilemmas: The dictatorial government may spend less on military equipment if they have some destructive devices and then citizens may have relatively larger disposable incomes in exchange for military oppressions; and the dictatorial government increases military expenditures as their economy grows to sap revolutionary interests. Based on these results, I also make some closing discussions.

Keywords: Strategic military expenditure; dictatorial government; revolutionary pressure; destructive devices; economic growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-12-07
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