Envy-free solutions, Non-linear equilibrium and Egalitarian-equivalence for the Package Assignment Problem

Somdeb Lahiri ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The first result in this paper says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a balanced vector of transfers so that the resulting allocation is fair. The second result here says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a pricing function defined on consumption bundles and a balanced vector of transfers so that they together form a non-linear market equilibrium. The first result is used to establish the second. Subsequently we prove the existence of egalitarian equivalent solutions for package assignment problems and shows that they satisfy the “fair share guaranteed” property.

JEL-codes: C79 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04-25, Revised 2008-04-28
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http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8444/ orginal version
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8498/ revised version

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