La leva istituzionale dell’autonomia: un freno allo sviluppo locale?

Andrea Consoli and Salvatore Spagano

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The following paper deals with a particular feature of local government within the italian institutional system by using the usual methods of economic analysis. It shows the possibility for regional authorities to reduce, delay or even obstruct the results that national policies can produce. If national policies liberalize a given economic sector, the rules protecting local identity may cause loss of welfare. This happens when regional administrators have the opportunity to reap a part of (or all) the monopolistic rent through their public positions. This work refers to the rules of the constitutional law that the Sicilian region has recently exploited.

JEL-codes: H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05
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