Autocracies and the International Sources of Cooperation

Soumyajit Mazumder

Working Paper from Harvard University OpenScholar

Abstract: Under what conditions do autocracies peacefully settle disputes? This study argues that as autocracies become more central in the network of liberal institutions such as Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), they are less likely to initiate a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID). As a state becomes more democratic, the effect of centrality within the PTA network on the peaceful dispute settlement dissipates. This is because greater embeddedness in the PTA regime is associated with enhanced transparency for autocracies, which allows autocracies to mitigate \emph{ex ante} informational problems in dispute resolution. Using a dataset of MID initiation from 1965-1999, this study finds robust empirical support for the aforementioned hypothesis. Moreover, the results are substantively significant as well. Further analysis into the causal mechanisms at work provides evidence in favor of the information mechanism. The results suggest that an autocrat's structural position within the international system can help to peacefully settle its disputes.

Date: 2015-06
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