Composition of Supervisory Boards in Germany: Inside or Outside Control of Banks?

Ettore Andreani (), Kathrin Dummann () and Doris Neuberger ()
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Ettore Andreani: University of Rostock

No 103, Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory from University of Rostock, Institute of Economics, Germany

Abstract: This paper examines the composition of supervisory boards of German banks for a sample of 41 large banks in the period 1999-2006. We find that the supervisory board structure reflects both outside control by shareholders and inside control by stakeholders. Most of the non-employee board members are representatives of other banks and industrial companies. The high presence of former executives and German board members indicates inside control. In banks controlled by other banks or insurance companies it is less likely that the chairperson of the supervisory board is a former executive of the same bank. Over time, inside networking through the supervisory board decreased.

Keywords: corporate governance; dual board system; principal agent theory; stakeholder theory; banks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-bec, nep-cba and nep-cfn
Date: Written
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ros:wpaper:103

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