Using Multiple Tools to Enhance Competition in Public Procurement

Clara Calini (), Alessandra Catenazzo () and Elisabetta Iossa ()
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Clara Calini: Italian Competition Authority - AGCM
Alessandra Catenazzo: Italian Competition Authority - AGCM
Elisabetta Iossa: CEIS & DEF, University of Rome "Tor Vergata" and AGCM, http://www.ceistorvergata.it

No 594, CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS

Abstract: Well-functioning competitive procurement is essential to reach efficiency of public services and public spending. Drawing from the experience of the Autorit`a Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, this paper argues that fostering competition in public procurement is most effective when employing a diverse range of tools. First, identifying the functioning of compensatory mechanisms that result in anomalous bidding behaviour, as well as diversifying the sources of information, is important for effectively prosecuting bid rigging ex post and helping contracting authorities detect anticompetitive conduct. Second, ex ante advocacy contributes to enhance the competence of public buyers, helping them design pro-competitive procurement processes. Third, adopting legality rating systems incentivizes compliance with competition law and also helps select the most efficient bidder. The paper makes these points whilst reviewing enforcement practice.

Keywords: Antitrust; Advocacy; Bid rigging; Legality Rating; Public Procurement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D73 H57 K4 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2025-02-25, Revised 2025-02-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law, nep-mic and nep-reg
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