Job Market Signaling, Stereotype Threat, and Counter-Stereotypical Behavior

Richard Asher Chisik

No 24, Working Papers from Ryerson University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We introduce stereotype threat in a signaling model. The novel feature of our model is that we allow a worker to choose their productivity, but we tie this choice to a cost that is given by their unobservable ability. It is this additional choice which generates a stereotype threat effect. The existence of multiple self-fulfilling stereotypes that satisfy a reasonable beliefs refinement is shown to be more likely if there is less variance in the distribution of abilities. We also show that a low endogenously correct stereotype forces a higher productivity worker with that stereotype to separate and, thereby, engage in counter-stereotypical behaviour. In this way a higher productivity worker from a discriminated against label overtakes a complacent pooling worker with a good stereotype label so that the good stereotype can generate a reputational Dutch disease. As the higher ability members of a group engage in counter-stereotypical behaviour the remaining partially-pooling group has even lower average productivity, which further reinforces the negative stereotype

JEL-codes: J70 D82 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-lab
Date: 2010-08
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